










Buy local, pollute less: What drives households  
to Join a community supported farm? 
 
 



















UMR INRA-Agrocampus Ouest SMART (Structures et Marchés Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires) 
UR INRA LERECO (Laboratoires d’Etudes et de Recherches Economiques) 
 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-03 
 




Buy local, pollute less: What drives households to join a 






INRA, UMR1302 SMART, F-35000 Rennes, France 




ENSAM, UMR1135 Laboratoire Montpelliérain d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée, F-












Auteur pour la correspondance / Corresponding author 
Douadia BOUGHERARA 
INRA, UMR SMART 
4 allée Adolphe Bobierre, CS 61103 
35011 Rennes cedex, France 
Email: Douadia.Bougherara@rennes.inra.fr 
Téléphone / Phone: +33 (0)2 23 48 56 03 




Buy local, pollute less: What drives households to join a  
community supported farm? 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines which factors determine the participation of households in long term 
contracting  with  local  farmers.  Are  households  motivated  by  reducing  the  environmental 
impacts  of  their  food  consumption?  A  discrete-choice  model  of  community  supported 
agriculture (CSA) participation is applied to a sample of 264 French households. The findings 
suggest that difficult-to-measure attributes, notably environmental considerations play a major 
role in explaining CSA participation. 
Keywords: community supported agriculture; food supply; transaction cost economics  




Analyse des déterminants de la participation à une AMAP 
 
Résumé 
Nous analysons les déterminants de la participation des ménages dans des contrats de long 
terme  avec  les  producteurs  locaux,  notamment  quelle  est  la  part  des  motivations 
environnementales dans les choix alimentaires. Un modèle de choix discret de participation à 
une AMAP (Association pour le Maintien d’une Agriculture Paysanne) est appliqué à 264 
ménages français. Les résultats indiquent que les attributs difficilement mesurables tels que 
les attributs environnementaux jouent un rôle majeur dans la décision de participer à une 
AMAP. 
Mots-clefs : AMAP, coûts de transaction  
Classification JEL : D13, D23, Q13  




Buy local, pollute less: What drives households to join a 
community supported farm? 
 
1.  Introduction 
In several developed countries, most households have secure quantities of food with verifiable 
attributes, so they increasingly focus on less tangible dimensions such as food safety and 
health (e.g., absence of pesticide residue), environmental conditions, geographic and social 
affinity (e.g., locally grown products, support of ‘small’ producers, fair trade considerations) 
and animal welfare. Accordingly, economists have drawn a useful distinction between search, 
experience, and credence attributes according to the ability of the buyer to assess the promised 
quality.  Search  attributes  refer  to  visual  aspects  of  the  product  (for  example,  its  color). 
Experience  attributes  refer  to  non  visual  but  easily  assessed  attributes,  i.e.,  after  the 
consumption (the taste, for example). Finally, credence attributes are those that cannot be 
assessed  even  after  consumption,  such  as  an  environmentally-friendly  process.  It  is  then 
obvious  that  information  asymmetry  is  more  problematic  when  dealing  with  credence 
attributes.  This  distinction  has  been  successfully  applied  to  the  analysis  of  food  quality, 
especially safety dimensions (Caswell and Modjuszka, 1996; Caswell and Grolleau, 2007).
1 
Without negating the importance of search and experience attributes in judging food quality, 
the  ratio  of  salient  credence  attributes  over  salient  search  and  experience  attributes  is 
increasing over time. Given that credence attributes are inherently ‘difficult to measure’ at the 
consumption  stage  (especially  if  they  include  very  specific  dimensions)  they  are  crucial 
parameters  in  terms  of  information  asymmetry  and  influence  the  household’s  overall 
judgment over food quality (Caswell and Grolleau, 2007).  
At  the  same  time,  several  developed  countries  have  experienced  increases  in  local  food 
supply, for example through community supported agriculture (CSA), where a farmer under 
contract  with a small  group of households delivers foodstuffs.  In 2004, there were 1,700 
CSAs in the U.S., between 500 and 1,000 in Japan, 90 in England, 60 in Quebec, and 50 in 
France.
2  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  determine  what  drives  households  to  join  a 
                                                 
1  See  also  Victorian  Department  of  Primary  Industries,  2004,  Beyond  Price  and  Quality:  Understanding 
Credence Attributes of Food Products in Victoria’s Priority Markets, Melbourne, Australia. 
2  http://alliancepec.free.fr/Webamap/index.php  (accessed  February,  9,  2007).  These  estimates  can  occult  the 
growing importance of CSA. For example, several millions of Japanese households participate in CSA or Teikei 




community  supported  farm.  Are  participating  households  motivated  by  environmental 
considerations?  Environmental  benefits  due  to  an  environmentally  friendly  production 
process
3  and  reduced  ‘food  miles’  (thanks  to  the  proximity  between  production  and 
consumption)  are  intuitively  appealing  and  frequently  used  to  legitimate  locally  grown 
products
4 despite some debates over the scientific validity of these claims (Smith et al., 2005; 
Blanke and Burdick, 2005; Stagl, 2002).
5 Interestingly, the Teikei system in Japan, widely 
considered the first CSA arrangement, was developed ‘by a small group of Japanese women 
concerned with food safety, pesticide use, processed and imported foods’. Labeling frauds for 
organic foods is also said to have stimulated increase in direct market relationships (Miles and 
Brown, 2005). New arrangements such as CSA can redefine to some extent the relationships 
between farmers and society.  
Our theoretical framework builds on transaction cost economics, hereafter TCE (Williamson, 
1985; 1991; 2005; Barzel, 1982; 2005) which seeks to explain why all transactions are not 
achieved through standard markets. Some transactions take place in the context of a hierarchy 
(integration between seller and buyer). Assuming the existence of positive transaction costs, 
TCE contends that profit maximizing entities will minimize overall costs by selecting the 
most efficient governance structure. Most of the explanatory power of the theory comes from 
the  transaction  dimensions  –asset  specificity  (Williamson,  1985;  1991;  2005)  or/and 
measurement issues (Barzel, 1982; 2004; 2005)– that determine which governance structure  
                                                                                                                                                          
(http://www.localharvest.org/), ‘the number of North American CSA farms has grown to about 2,000 to 2,500’ 
and ‘growth has really picked up since 2000 with about 120 starting each year’ (Batz, B.J., 2007, Community 
Supported Agriculture brings the farm to your front door, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March, 1
st, http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/07060/765794-34.stm, accessed March, 6, 2007). 
For anecdotal evidence on the growth of CSA arrangements in some major cities of United States, see also 
Saulny S., Cutting Out the Middlemen, Shoppers Buy Slices of Farms, The New York Times, July 10, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/us/10farms.html?pagewanted=print. 
3 The production process is frequently tailored to fit the precise demands of the consumer group. 
4 ‘most [shareholders] agreed that the urge to buy and spend locally — to avoid the costs and environmental 
degradation that come with shipping and storage — was behind the decision to join’ (Saulny S., Cutting Out the 
Middlemen,  Shoppers  Buy  Slices  of  Farms,  The  New  York  Times,  July  10,  2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/us/10farms.html?pagewanted=print.). 
5 The non-academic press has recently echoed these counter-arguments in an article titled ‘Good food? Why 
ethical shopping harms the world?’, The Economist, December, 9-15




will  minimize  the  level  of  transaction  costs  in  various  circumstances.  Transactions  with 
various levels of ‘difficulty of measurement’ are aligned with governance structures so as to 
effect a discriminating alignment that minimizes the sum of production and transaction costs. 
Accordingly, we conducted a survey to determine whether the measurement difficulty related 
to environmental and social attributes explains the commitment of households in long term 
contracts with farmers.  
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  characterizes  CSA 
arrangements along with two other supply modes used by households to buy their agricultural 
products,  that  is,  traditional  ‘spot’  markets  and  home  production.  Section  3  reviews  the 
literature devoted to the motives behind CSA commitments and presents the TCE conceptual 
framework. The main proposition drawn from the conceptual framework is tested empirically 
in section 4. Results are also discussed and some policy implications are stressed. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  Characterization of CSA arrangements along with traditional ‘spot’ markets and 
home production 
While some consumers rely on traditional retailers to get agricultural products, others contract 
directly with local farmers, e.g., CSA arrangements, or produce their food themselves. These 
different  ways  of  supply  are  not  mutually  exclusive  and  generate  different  environmental 
outcomes. In developed countries, the grocery stores have the highest ‘market share’ among 
these three modes of supply. Let us briefly characterize the two polar supply channels, i.e., 












Table 1: Summary of distinctive criteria between the three ‘archetypes’ for food supply  
(Source: The authors) 
Criteria  Traditional markets  CSAs  Household 
production
6 
Degree of product 
standardization 
+++  +  - 












-  ++  +++ 
Who incurs the risk 
(e.g., reduced yields 
due to climatic or pest 
factors)? 
The farmer  The farmer and the 
consumer 
The consumer 




-  ++  +++ 
Price fluctuation  +++  +  - 
 
-, +, ++ and +++ refer to ‘very weak or absent’, ‘weak’, ‘high’, and ‘very high’, respectively. 
 
In traditional retailing, the products are standardized. The transacting parties are frequently 
anonymous without dependency relationship between them.
7 To convince households about 
credence attributes, retailers frequently use various devices such as brand names, third party 
certificates  or  labeling
8  (Caswell  and  Modjuszka,  1996;  Caswell  and  Grolleau,  2007). 
Households can also produce themselves the agricultural food they consume, generally in 
small familial gardens. In France, home production as a share of total food expenditures was 
declining and estimated at about 10 % in the nineties (Caillavet et al., 1998). 
                                                 
6 Household production, when it is a hobby, is very different from traditional markets and CSAs. The household 
production addressed here is driven by efficiency considerations (minimization of overall costs) rather than by 
hobby considerations. 
7 This characterization is, to some extent, oversimplified. Customers are dependent on the existence of large 
stores for their food.  On the other side, stores are dependent upon their regions for labor and operating permits. 
People from the community work in the large stores, so there is familiarity between them, especially when they 
work in the same store for many years. 
8 An interesting example of third party certificate guaranteeing pesticide residue free product is the NutriClean® 




In contracting with local farmers, things are different. Contract duration goes from 6 months 
to one year. CSA ‘consists of individuals who pledge support to a farm operation so that the 
farmland becomes, either legally or spiritually, the community’s farm (…). By direct sales to 
community  members,  who  have  provided  the  farmer  with  working  capital  in  advance, 
growers receive better prices for their crops, gain some financial security, and are relieved of 
much of the burden of marketing’.
9 It should be noticed that prices received by farmers can be 
better notably because there are less intermediaries and households can work freely at the 
farm
10 (Cooley and Lass, 2005; Stagl, 2002). Consequently, costs are reduced and the added 
value is quasi directly recuperated by the farmer, even if the prices of conventional products 
and CSA products are similar. Nevertheless, this perceived price cannot include from the 
consumer viewpoint the transport cost and the adaptation costs, for example due to the lack of 
variety and guarantee on quantities delivered. The price issue raises the question of whether 
the value of more easily measured attributes is so much greater than the less-easily measured 
attributes that the less-easily measured ones do not really influence the ultimate choices of 
consumers. Nevertheless, empirical evidence about prices of CSA products in comparison of 
other channels is too fragmentary to draw a reliable conclusion. 
It is often argued that buying a product from a CSA allows the buyer to put a face back on a 
person’s  food.
11  According  to  O’Hara  and  Stagl  (2001,  p.  546),  ‘multiple  dimensions  of 
interaction  and  communication  are  relevant  to  establishing  the  trust  lost  in  disembodied 
markets. And  while personal interaction may  not be a  guarantee for trust, it may fill the 
vacuum  created  by  the  erosion  of  ‘faceless  commitments’  in  illusive  global  markets  as 
‘facework commitments’ are re-established’. Formally, in CSA arrangements, the consumer 
                                                 
9  DeMuth,  S.,  1993,  Defining  Community  Supported  Agriculture,  An  Excerpt  from  Community  Supported 
Agriculture (CSA): An Annotated Bibliography and Resource Guide, USDA, National Agricultural Library, 
Alternative Farming Systems Information Center (available at: http://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/csa/csadef.htm). 
10 ‘Shareholders are not required to work the fields, but they can if they want, and many do’ (Saulny S., Cutting 
Out  the  Middlemen,  Shoppers  Buy  Slices  of  Farms,  The  New  York  Times,  July  10,  2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/us/10farms.html?pagewanted=print.). 
11 It is precisely the meaning of the word ‘Teikei’ in Japanese, corresponding to CSA in the U.S. Nevertheless, 
the face-to-face trust approach to claim verification does not necessarily require a 6-month commitment and can 
be  considered,  and  as  a  part  of  the  product  with  its  own  status  value,  as  well  as  part  of  the  contractual 
arrangement (see Severson, 2008). Lastly, the face-to-face trust approach may not be working in the sense that 
CSAs  may  not  be  living  up  to  the  claims  that  consumers  must  accept  based  on  face-to-face  trust  (or  the 




group participates in the decision of what is produced and how it is produced. This definition 
can  include  specific  environmental  requirements.  Reality  is  frequently  different  because 
people do not actively participate in the production decisions. Nevertheless, consumers may 
enjoy the formal possibility of doing so. 
Moreover,  local  foods  are  frequently  presented  and  marketed,  sometimes  unduly,  as  a 
response to environmental concerns regarding the growing distances that (imported) foods 
consumed within developed countries travel (Pretty et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2005; Stagl, 
2002).  When  an  unobservable  attribute  is  proposed  in  traditional  markets,  a  third  party 
intervenes  to  certify  the  promised  quality  (i.e.,  institutional  trust)  whereas  the  CSA 
arrangement  lies  on  interpersonal  relationships  and  mutual  trust.  Contrary  to  traditional 
retailing, under CSA arrangements, the risks are shared by the two sides (Lamine, 2005). If 
the  outcome  is  less  (respectively  more)  than  expected,  for  example  due  to  bad  climatic 
conditions, there is no refund for the participants (respectively a sharing among participants). 
In  CSA  arrangements,  prices  are  frequently  negotiated  making  agents  ‘price  makers’.
12  
Sometimes, real-world arrangements differ from textbook arrangements in several respects. 
For  example,  in  France,  some  farmers  engaged  in  CSA  when  confronted  with  less  than 
expected  harvests  have  purchased  organic  foods  to  provide  households  with  ‘sufficient’ 
quantities of products. 
The  above  characterization  of  organizational  arrangement  is  somewhat  caricatural.  Many 
‘shades of gray’ co-exist. For example, in Denmark, ‘packages of meat and poultry carry a bar 
code that, when scanned by a machine in the store, calls up pictures of the farm where the 
animal was raised, as well as information about its diet, living conditions, the date of its 
slaughter and so on’.
13 Another example is whether credible certificates and labels on markets 
allow consumers to overcome some of the critical issues they may be concerned with, e.g., 
organic, Integrated Pest Management, specific origin, or GMO free products (Caswell and 
Modjuszka, 1996). In the many shades of gray, a new trend in United States is to have a 
garden at home in the backyard, without having to garden it by hiring a farmer that will ‘weed 
it weekly and even harvest the bounty, gently placing a box of vegetables on the back porch 
                                                 
12 In several real world examples, the negotiation of the price takes into account the prices set in other markets, 
e.g., local markets (Lamine, 2005). 
13  Pollan,  M.,  2001,  Produce  politics,  The  Way  we  Live  Now,  New  York  Times  Magazine,  January,  14, 




when he leaves’ (Severson, 2008). Furthermore, the analysis above assumes that the retail 
store,  CSA  and  home  garden  products  are  substitutes.  But  if  each  supply  channel  is 
considered as a multi-output technology providing not only food for consumption but also 
other goods such as leisure, the analysis could lead to different results. For example, home 
gardens provide other benefits besides just vegetables, such as practicing hobbies or being in 
the trend (Severson, 2008). 
 
3.  Review of the literature and theoretical framework 
There is a sizeable general literature in sociology (e.g., De Lind, 1999; Stagl, 2002; Lamine, 
2005) and economics (e.g., Cooley and Lass, 1996; Farnsworth et al., 1996; Verhaegen and 
Van Huylenbroeck, 2001) devoted to alternative supply channels (CSA, farmers’ markets, 
direct selling, etc.). Fewer papers have analyzed CSA arrangements as a possible response to 
concerns  related  to  global  food  markets  (e.g.,  O’Hara  and  Stagl,  2001).  Contributions 
investigating  the  motives  behind  households’  engagement  in  a  CSA  in  a  rigorous  and 
systematic way are relatively scarce. What follows is a presentation of the main studies and 
their results. The Cooley and Lass (1996) survey carried out in Amherst Massachusetts asked 
people (N=192) about their motivations for joining a CSA. The most important reasons were 
quality  of  produce,  support  for  local  farming,  environmental  and  food  safety  concerns. 
O’Hara and Stagl (2001) report the results of a survey involving 74 CSA members in upstate 
New York. Respondents were asked to rank their motivations for becoming CSA members. 
The top eight motivations (ranked as very important and important) for joining a CSA were 
namely  ‘getting  fresh  vegetables’,  ‘getting  organically  grown  vegetables’,  ‘wanting  to  be 
supportive  of  local  farms’,  ‘having  concern  for  the  environment’,  ‘reducing  packaging’, 
‘knowing where food comes from’ and ‘doing something for health’. Other motivations such 
as ‘sharing the risk with farmers’ and ‘a stronger sense of community’ ranked significantly 
lower  as  important  to  indifferent.  Interestingly,  when  compared  to  a  control  group,  CSA 
members  are  ‘more  concerned  about  pesticides,  have  a  higher  preference  for  personal 
interaction  when  buying  food  products,  and  consider  themselves  more  politically  active’ 
(O’Hara and Stagl, 2001, p. 548). Bond et al. (2006) asked a representative sample of U.S. 
consumers  (N=1,549)  to  rank  their  motivations  for  different  channels  through  an  online 
survey. Unfortunately, the category of CSA members was not distinguished from other kinds 




food systems (30% of the sample) have high expectations for product quality (e.g., freshness, 
taste, safety) and place high value on supporting local producers. 
Unlike the above surveyed literature, our empirical strategy is based on predictions drawn 
from transaction cost economics. Concretely, we assume that households seek to maximize 
their utility by selecting the most efficient governance structure. Therefore, the households’ 
decision  fits  the  paradigmatic  ‘make  or  buy’  decision  addressed  by  the  transaction  cost 
economics (TCE) framework: Should a household make its own agricultural products, buy 
them on the spot market, or maintain an ongoing relationship with a particular supplier? TCE 
à  la  Barzel  predicts  a  discriminating  alignment  between  the  main  transaction  exchange 
attributes, namely the measurement difficulty, and the governance mode (Williamson, 1985; 
1991;  Barzel,  1982,  2005;  Anderson  and  Schmittlein,  1984).  Governance  arrangements 
provide  means  of  reducing  measurement  costs,  which  are  especially  significant  when 
transactions  include  difficult-to-measure  characteristics  (Darby  and  Karni,  1973;  Barzel, 
2005). In other words, the transaction may be organized through different arrangements in 
order to reduce measurement costs that may ensure a closer correspondence between product 
value and price (Barzel, 1982).  
Unlike Williamson (1985; 2005) who emphasizes dependency between partners caused by 
dedicated investments in the transaction (asset specificity), the measurement branch of TCE 
stresses the importance of measuring and enforcing property rights to the specific attributes of 
complex assets. In any transaction, both the seller and the buyer will require some verification 
of the measurements of the exchanged goods: the seller to assure himself he is not giving up 
too much, the buyer to assure himself he is not receiving too little (Barzel, 1982, p. 32). As 
stressed  above,  the  difficulty  to  measure  and  related  measurement  costs  increase  when 
moving  from  search  to  experience  and  to  credence  characteristics,  especially  if  they  are 
related  to  a  local  context.  More  concretely,  we  contend  that  some  people  do  not  value 
similarly fair prices to local farmers and fair prices to farmers, regardless of their location. 
Moreover,  the  more  attributes  are  personalized  (respectively  standardized),  the  higher 
(respectively  lower)  the  measurement  difficulty  (Barzel,  2004).  As  the  hazard  posed  by 
measurement issues increases, vertical integration may lower overall measurement costs, by 
reducing incentives to withhold information.  
Nevertheless, there is a tradeoff between economizing on measurement costs and gains from 
specialization, which defines whether to ‘make or buy’. Indeed, if all stages of production are 




but advantages of specialization are lost (Barzel, 1982, p. 39). In other terms, for easy-to-
measure attributes such as those which are well standardized, spot markets may constitute the 
less costly organizational arrangement. At the other extreme, when attributes are very difficult 
to measure, individuals can overcome this difficulty by the ‘simple expedient of doing things 
themselves’ in other words, through household production. Between these two extremes, for 
intermediate level of difficulty to measure, hybrid forms such as long-term relations may 
constitute the most cost effective method to organize the transaction (Barzel, 1982; 2005). 
An  important  and  testable  implication  can  be  drawn  from  the  preceding  analysis.  When 
difficult-to-measure  or  individual-tailored  attributes  are  at  stake  (e.g.,  local  environment, 
support of ‘small’ and close producers, local employment, rural lifestyle, ‘fair’ prices), long 
term contracting between farmers and consumers can be more transaction cost economizing 
than the traditional and impersonal retailing. Cooley and Lass (1996) showed that CSA prices 
are significantly lower than those of groceries.
14 These differences can come from reduced 
transaction costs, e.g., because CSA arrangements are supported by interpersonal proximity 
and trust, do not require costly third party certification
15 (Farnsworth et al., 1996) and because 
households participate in farm tasks
16. Moreover, CSA participants do not necessarily assess 
the farm compliance with the negotiated rules, which could be costly, but enjoy the presence 
of the farmer at each delivery and the formal possibility of visiting the farm (Lamine, 2005). 
In  the  following  section  we  present  the  survey  that  was  administrated  to  test  our  main 
hypothesis: The more people are concerned with credence properties of agrofood products, 
the more likely they are to supply by long term contracting. 
 
4.  An empirical test of the determinants of households’ participation in long term 
contracting with farmers 
                                                 
14 Noteworthy, a household may incur an increase in other costs such as searching for the products, picking it up 
and adapting the familial meals to the foodstuffs delivered.  
15 Given that some farms in France (the country of our empirical study) are requested to comply simultaneously 
with several different standards (e.g., GlobalGAP, BRC, Integrated Farming) rough estimates of certification 
costs and other related costs (registering day-to-day interventions, filling forms, etc.) can reach several thousands 
of euros.  
16 Saulny S., Cutting Out the Middlemen, Shoppers Buy Slices of Farms, The New York Times, July 10, 2008, 




In summer 2006, we conducted a mail survey on 264 households located in the metropolitan 
area of Dijon and Dole (France). These locations, mixing urban and rural communities, offer 
an ‘easy’ access to a large array of supply channels (e.g., close supermarkets, local farmers’ 
markets,  home  gardens,  etc.),  and  have  several  local  communities  of  farmers  involved  in 
conventional and unconventional marketing channels. We surveyed the whole population of 
CSA participants in Dijon and Dole, which is 89 households. All were committed in long 
term  contracts
17  (≥  6  months)  with  local  farmers  for  vegetable  supply.  We  also  selected 
randomly 175 households from the phone directory in the geographic areas covered by the 
surveyed  CSA.  Our  survey  administration  procedures  are  based  on  a  slightly  modified 
Dillman’s  Tailored  Design  Method,  a  high  performance  survey  methodology  proven  to 
maximize response rates (Dillman, 2000). Non-CSA members were first contacted by phone 
then received the questionnaire by regular mail. No recall has been done. CSA members were 
contacted directly at the delivery point. Thus, people having an interest in issues related to 
vegetables  (e.g.,  safety)  may  have  been  more  likely  to  answer.  We  received  169  useable 
responses; 48 from CSA members (53.93%) and 121 from non-CSA members (69.14%).  
We asked all respondents to indicate traditional demographic variables (age, sex, income, 
marital status and so forth), their choice criteria for vegetables and some other questions on 
their  trust  in  organic  and  fair  trade  certification  schemes,  their  level  of  involvement  in 
associations, and the identity of their main suppliers of vegetables. Specifically, people were 
asked to answer a question formulated as follows: ‘How important is this variable to you in 
the choice of your vegetables?’. A 5-point Likert scale was used to measure the importance of 
quality, price, practical aspects (CSA proximity, opening hours and scope of products), and 
environmental (less chemical application, less transport) and social considerations (supporting 
local farming, relationships with the farmers and other consumers).
18 The variables used in 
estimation, their acronyms, their meaning and general sample statistics are indicated in Table 
2. No problem of multicollinearity has been detected. 
 
                                                 
17 Of course, one might argue that since people are consuming vegetables for decades, a 6-month contract for 
delivery is not that long term. Nevertheless, compared to usual purchases of vegetables, CSA arrangements can 
be  considered  as  hybrid  forms  in  the  Williamson  typology  (2005).  Moreover,  the  volatility  of  food  prices 
compared to other goods makes a 6-month commitment quite strong. The strength of the commitment is of 
course higher when the share of food expenses in the household budget is high. 











Variable  Definition 





Dependent variable               
CSA 
Households participating in 
CSA 
Dummy variable (=1 if CSA 
household) 
0.284  0.452  1  0  0  0  - 
Independent variables               
UNDER35 
Respondent's age lower than 
35 years  
Dummy variable (=1 if under 
35) 
0.207  0.406  0.688  0.468  0.165  0.373  *** 
OVER3000 
Household's income lower 
than €3,000/month 
Dummy variable (=1 if over 
€3,000/month) 
0.314  0.465  0.458  0.504  0.256  0.438  ** 
ASSO 
Household committed in 
associations 
Dummy variable (=1 if 
committed) 
0.314  0.465  0.542  0.504  0.223  0.418  *** 
FRESH 
Freshness and taste of 
vegetables as an important 
criterion 
Dummy variable (=1 if  
important criterion) 
0.959  0.200  0.979  0.144  0.950  0.218  ns 
COSMETIC 
Cosmetic aspect as an 
important criterion 
Dummy variable (=1 if  
important criterion) 
0.651  0.478  0.438  0.501  0.736  0.443  *** 
PRICE 
Price as an important 
criterion 
Dummy variable (=1 if  
important criterion) 
0.473  0.501  0.333  0.476  0.529  0.501  ** 
PRACTICAL 
PROXIMITY as an important 
criterion  
OPENING HOURS as an 
important criterion 
SCOPE as an important 
criterion 







































(less chemical application, 
less transport) as an important 
criterion 
Dummy variable (=1 if  
important criterion) 
0.740  0.440  0.958  0.202  0.653  0.478  *** 
SOCIAL 
Social considerations 
(supporting local farming, 
personal relationships with 
the farmers and other 
consumers) as an important 
criterion 
Dummy variable (=1 if  
important criterion) 
0.817  0.388  0.958  0.202  0.760  0.429  *** 
 
a The test compares CSA and non CSA households: (ns) stands for not significant, (**) and (***) stand for significant at 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively.
 




We did chi-square tests to compare CSA and non-CSA households. The results indicate (i) 
that CSA households are younger, have higher incomes and are more active in associations 
that non-CSA households, and (ii) that non-CSA households are more concerned by cosmetic 
and  price  attributes  than  their  CSA  counterparts  who  care  more  for  opening,  scope, 
environmental  and  social  attributes.  Concerning  our  hypothesis  on  the  role  of  search, 
experience  and  credence  attributes,  simple  chi-square  tests  provide  support  in  that  CSA 
households care more for difficult-to-measure attributes (environmental and social). We carry 
out further investigation to provide more control. 
To  investigate  empirically  the  determinants  of  households’  participation  in  long  term 
contracting  with  farmers  for  vegetable  supply,  let  us  consider  the  household  choice  in  a 
random utility model. We specify a linear model for the underlying economic variable driving 
participation (a latent, unobserved variable): 
*
1 1 2 2 3 3 i i i i i Y X X X a b b b e = + + + +  with  N i ,... 2 , 1 =    (1) 
where 1i X represents  a  vector  of  variables  for  households’  characteristics  (age,  income, 
involvement  in  associations), 2i X   captures  search  and  experience  attributes  (freshness  and 
taste  of  vegetables,  cosmetic  aspects,  price,  practical  aspects  [proximity,  opening  hours, 
number  of  products  proposed]),  and  3i X   credence  attributes  (environmental  and  social 
considerations).  1 b  to  3 b  represent slope coefficients to be estimated, and a  and e  represent 
the intercept and the error term, respectively. The interpretation of the latent variable in this 
kind of model is typically that of an overall net utility originating from participation in CSA. 
When this latent variable is positive, participation gains outweigh losses due to participation. 
Thus, the model of participation for the households can be stated as a discrete-choice model 













i i   (2) 
We specify a logistic distribution for e  and maximize the log-likelihood of the Logit model 
(Greene, 2003), to estimate model parameters up to a constant. Logit estimation results are 
presented  in  Table  3,  together  with  goodness-of-fit  measures  (Maximum-Likelihood 
estimation).  




Table  3:  Logit  model  of  households’  participation  in  long  term  contracting  for 
vegetables supply 
Variables  Parameter 






INTERCEPT  -7.215***  -3.12  –  – 
UNDER35  1.870***  3.62  0.243***  0.074 
OVER3000  0.792  1.60  0.110  0.076 
ASSO  1.456***  2.77  0.219**  0.094 
FRESH  1.834  1.05  0.127**  0.060 
COSMETIC  -0.879*  -1.73  -0.121  0.080 
PRICE  0.210  0.42  0.026  0.063 
PROXIMITY  0.255  0.50  0.032  0.064 
OPENING HOURS  -0.503  -0.87  -0.059  0.063 
SCOPE  -1.752***  -3.33  -0.271***  0.096 
ENV  2.880***  3.35  0.245***  0.055 
SOCIAL  1.997**  2.04  0.165***  0.052 
McFadden R2 
-2 log L 





Number of observations 











(*), (**) and (***) stand for parameter significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The marginal effect for a 
binary  explanatory  variable  is  computed  as  the  difference  of  the  two  probabilities  associated  with  the discrete  change 
between 0 and 1 for that variable. Marginal effects are computed at the sample mean. 
 
To  better  interpret  the  sensitivity  of  the  probability  of  participation  with  respect  to 
explanatory  variables,  we  also  report  marginal  effects  (right-hand  side  of  Table  3).  For 
continuous  explanatory  variables,  marginal  effects  measure  the  change  in  the  estimated 
probability following an increase of the explanatory variable by 1 unit. For discrete variables 
however,  the  marginal  effect  is  calculated  as  the  difference  between  the  probabilities 
estimated  at  the  sample  means  when  the  dummy  variable  takes  the  values  of  1  and  0, 
respectively.  The  percentage  of  correct  predictions,  the  sensitivity  and  specificity  are 
satisfactory. The McFadden R2 of 0.31 indicates that unobserved individual heterogeneity is 




The  chi-squared  statistic  for  the  hypothesis  test  of  all  coefficients  being  equal  to  zero  is 
significant above the level of 1%. We are now in a position to convey information about the 
impact of each independent variable on CSA participation, based on the parameter estimates, 
statistical  significance  and  marginal  effects
19.  Being  under  35  and  being  involved  in 
associations increase the probability ceteris paribus, that the household will belong to a CSA. 
These findings might also reflect the way by which new members are informed and recruited, 
that is through relationships in specific social networks. These results are useful for CSA 
promoters who may improve the targeting of their recruitment rather than adopting a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach.  
To  test  for  the  main  hypothesis  of  the  paper  that  households  concerned  with  credence 
attributes of goods are more likely to become CSA members, we introduced in the model a 
measure  of  household  concerns  for  attributes  that  are  mainly  search  or  experience  ones 
(freshness and taste of vegetables, cosmetic aspects, price, practical aspects) and for attributes 
that are mainly credence ones (environmental and social considerations). Results in Table 3 
indicate that the probability of participation in a CSA is negatively affected when households 
care for cosmetic aspects of goods and the scope of products. The scope of products is the 
dominant variable (in the sense of the largest marginal effect), followed by environmental 
considerations.  In  other  terms,  the  number  of  products  offered  may  prevent  people  from 
participating in a CSA arrangement. Consequently, promoting CSA among households may 
require caring about this aspect, by increasing the choice set and improving the cosmetic 
aspects of vegetables. Interestingly, in France, some CSA farms join their efforts to propose a 
broader range of products. According to our estimation, proximity and opening hours play no 
significant  role.  Therefore,  targeting  households  close  to  the  CSA  delivery  point  or 
alternatively selecting an appropriate delivery point (e.g., home or workplace delivery) may 
not be so crucial to increase CSA market penetration. In addition, given the recentness of 
CSA  in  France  compared  to  Japan  or  USA,  it  is  possible  that  the  first  wave  of  French 
households are less exigent and more involved. Other search/experience attributes (freshness, 
price) play no significant role in the decision to enroll in a CSA. Freshness and price may not 
be the drivers of CSA participation. These results probably show that, in our sample, prices 
and freshness are perceived as equivalent in CSA and other supply channels. 
                                                 
19 Several versions of the model have been estimated to investigate the robustness of results to the omission of 




Environmental  and  social  credence  attributes  are  statistically  significant  drivers  of  CSA 
commitment. Households sensitive to environmental and local social issues are more likely to 
participate in CSA arrangements, ceteris paribus. Consequently, our main hypothesis is not 
rejected: the more people are concerned with credence properties of agrofood products, the 
more  likely  they  are  to  supply  by  long  term  contracting.  Thus,  giving  households  the 
opportunity to control more precisely the way their food is produced and get what they want 
in comparison to more ‘impersonal markets’ could constitute a strong argument in favor of 
CSA. Moreover, emphasizing the environmental and social benefits of CSA arrangements,
20 
especially at the local level, may constitute a strong argument for promoting households’ 
participation. 
 
5.  Conclusion and future directions 
Long term contracts between farmers and consumers are an institutional innovation likely to 
reduce  measurement  costs.  Because  some  difficult-to-measure  characteristics  desired  by 
concerned households are not well addressed by traditional retailers, CSA can constitute a 
more cost-effective means to achieve the transaction. Nevertheless, food quality is evolving 
and the classification of a salient attribute as search, experience or credence changes over 
time. Consequently, transactions mediated through a given channel are likely to evolve over 
time.  Our  results  also  provide  guidance  to  CSA  promoters  in  order  to  improve  practical 
services associated with CSA participation (scope of products, cosmetic aspects) and target 
their efforts towards households that are more likely to participate.  
Our contribution shows that environmental considerations play a major role in explaining 
households’  participation  in  CSA  arrangements.  Nevertheless,  we  do  not  investigate  the 
objective  environmental  performance  of  these  initiatives  and  whether  these  decentralized 
arrangements  are  sufficient  to  ensure  an  acceptable  level  of  environmental  protection.  A 
fundamental issue not analyzed in this contribution is whether the face-to-face trust system is 
effective  and  whether  the  farms  engaged  in  the  CSA  business  are  really  delivering  their 
environmental and social commitments. Unfulfilled promises means that the CSA model is 
providing  sub-optimal  outcomes  for  the  consumers  choosing  them  for  their  credence 
attributes. Indeed, people can be cheated and will eventually find out and stop participating in 
                                                 
20 Even if the claimed benefits are scientifically contentious (Smith et al., 2005; Blanke and Burdick, 2005; 




CSAs, or they are participating for some other reasons, allowing this arrangement to go on. A 
detailed analysis of the welfare effects of CSA also needs an investigation of the supply side. 
What are the production effects of CSA participation for farmers in terms of input use and 
land allocation? How does CSA compare to other price and production risk mitigation devices 
such as insurance or agricultural policies? These interesting questions would provide keys to 
assess the real environmental impacts of CSA participation. 
Our analysis has some limitations that deserve further research. Investigating the patterns of 
home  production  (corresponding  to  hierarchy)  that  was  not  feasible  because  of  data 
limitations, may constitute a natural extension. CSA can also constitute a more efficient way 
(compared to traditional retailing) of provision of public goods, such as the local environment 
quality tied with private benefits such  as freshness, greater taste and nutritional qualities. 
Interestingly, it seems necessary that future studies devote special attention to the overlap 
between  the  (local/global)  public/private  dimension  and  search/experience/credence 
dimension
21. Moreover, alternative organizational arrangements have major implications for 
the allocation of created value  among agents of the food chain. Policy makers aiming at 
ensuring sufficient revenues for farmers may be interested in these hybrid forms that may 
reshape food chain supply and allow an alternative value repartition among agents. 
                                                 
21 For example, investigating whether households participating in a CSA have stronger concerns over private 
credence characteristics (e.g., less pesticides) or over public credence characteristics (e.g., less CO2 emissions) 
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